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Corruption as a source of government project failure in developing countries: Evidence 
from Ghana 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study explores how corruption impacts the failure of government projects in developing 
countries with evidence from the Ghanaian context. This study solicits the perceptions of 
project management practitioners (14), contractors (6), government officials (clients) (5) and 
the general public (5) on the subject. The findings indicate that corruption, influence 
government project failure on all the failure criteria used as the evaluating tool. However, 
corruption influences failure at two different levels: project management and product phase. 
At the management level, corruption has direct influence whilst at the product phase level, 
the influence is indirect.  
INTRODUCTION  
This study explores how corruption impacts on the failure of government projects in 
developing countries with evidence from the Ghanaian context. Corruption is a constant 
concern for countries facing economic problems (D’Agostino et al., 2013). Increasingly, 
researchers have devoted extant literature to the discussion of the phenomenon; however, 
these discussions have focused mainly on the relationship between corruption and variables 
such as; economic development (Riesman, 2000; Huang, 2016), social effects (Saha & 
Gounder, 2013), innovation (Paunov, 2016), firm management quality (Athanasouli and 
Goujard, 2015), gross domestic product (GDP) (Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2004), returns on 
investment (Boycko et al., 1996), increase in government budget (Hessami, 2014), political 
discontent, instability and violence (Aisen & Veiga, 2013), rule-violating intentions 
(Sundstrom, 2016), democracy (Jetter et al., 2015), and inequality (Dobson & Ramlogan-
Dobson, 2012).  
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Despite the extensive research devoted to the subject, there is limited research on the 
potential impact of corruption on project failure. Some researchers (Heeks, 1999; Corojan & 
Criado, 2012; Kim, 2014) have mentioned in their research that corruption may influence e-
government project failure but, they did not discuss how this really happens. The closest 
research on corruption and projects failure is the theoretical exposition of Aladwani (2016) 
on how corruption could be a source of e-government project failure. We, therefore, 
contribute to governance, project management and corruption literature by conducting an 
exploratory study on how corruption may influence government project failure in developing 
countries using Ghana as a case study.  The main question is: How does corruption, influence 
Ghanaian government project failure? 
However, project failure in this context is vague as studies over the years indicated that 
projects failure criteria are many (Atkinson, 1999; Ahonen & Savolianen, 2010; Mir & 
Pinnington, 2014). The study conducted by Ruuska & Teiglanad (2009) on Bygga Villa 
(Sweden) identified satisfaction of the individual stakeholder’s needs as a subjective 
component of project success. Davis (2014) echoes this claim by asserting that 
success/failure is a matter of stakeholders’ perception. Nevertheless, the studies’ of Heeks 
(2002, 2006) challenge the subjectivity of project failure to some extent. The studies contend 
that if a project fails at the initiation phase, that project could be classed as a total failure. 
Thus, once the project is abandoned before actual implementation or its abandoned halfway 
through the project life cycle, then such projects could be described as a total failure. In this 
research, one of the criteria in which we assess how corruption may influence government 
project failure is abandonment. This leads us to our first research question: 
RQ1: How does corruption influence Ghanaian government project abandonment? 
Traditionally, projects were assessed using time, cost and requirements as the 
evaluating criteria. Advocates of this definition of project failure, such as De Wit (1988), 
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Turner (1996), Kappelman et al. (2006) and El Emama and Koru (2008) have concluded that 
that project success/failure should be judged on whether the project has met the set time, cost 
and requirement. They contend that a project is said to have failed when it fails to meet one 
and/or all the triple constraints. However, De Wit (1988), Turner (1996) and Wateridge 
(1998) did not rule out the existence of other possible success/failure criteria. In these 
performance criteria, projects are assessed at the management phase. This leads us to our 
second, third and fourth research questions: 
RQ2: How does corruption influence cost overrun of Ghanaian government projects? 
RQ3: How does corruption influence time overrun of Ghanaian government projects? 
RQ4: How does corruption influence negative requirement deviation of Ghanaian 
government projects? 
On the other hand, studies such as De Wit (1988), Pinto & Slevin (1988), Turner 
(1996), Atkinson (1999), Abednego & Ogunlana (2006), Kappelman et al. (2006), El Emama 
& Koru (2008) and Toor & Ogunlana (2010) have called for the inclusion of other factors 
that are beyond the management phase. They argue that assessing project only in the 
management phase is not sufficient because it is possible for a project to deviate from its 
projected time, cost and requirement and yet be considered successful at the usage phase. A 
typical example is the widely cited Sydney Opera House project, which is considered as an 
engineering masterpiece despite taking 15 years to complete and being 14 times over budget 
(Jugdev and Muller, 2005; Ika, 2009; Savolianen et al., 2012). This leads us to our fifth and 
sixth research question: 
RQ5: How does corruption influence stakeholder dissatisfaction of Ghanaian 
government projects? 
RQ6: How does corruption influence Ghanaian government projects that may lead to 
the retarding of the sector where projects are implemented and national development? 
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The topic is of interest to both academic and practice. Academically, this study sheds 
light on corruption as a major contributing factor for project failure in developing countries. 
This would serve as a springboard for further research into the relationship between 
corruption and projects failure, particularly quantitative study. Practically, by exploring how 
corruption may influence government project failure using multiple project’s failure criteria, 
it provides a deeper understanding of how corruption affects government project performance 
and therefore, the findings can be used as a guide during government projects 
implementation.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Ghanaian government programs and project failure  
The Ghanaian context is important to this study because government projects play an 
important role in national development (Eichengreen & Vazquez, 1999; Alic, 2008). Since 
government policies often translate into programs and projects (Goodman & Love, 1980; 
Bitler & Karoly, 2015); the performance of these projects is central to government 
performance (Alzahrani & Emsley, 2013). Literature suggests that developed economies were 
developed through the implementation of government projects and programs (Eichengreen, 
1994; Eichengreen, 1996; Alic, 2008). Growth witnessed in the last two to three decades in 
emerging economies indicates that government projects are inevitable in national 
development (Gichoya, 2005; Luk, 2009). Nevertheless, many of these projects faces several 
setbacks such as the total abandonment (Kumar and Best, 2006), cost deviation (Aziz, 2013), 
schedule deviation (Fallahnejad, 2013; Marzouk & El-Rasas, 2013), scope deviation (Liu et 
al., 2011), and stakeholders’ dissatisfaction (Ahonen & Savolianen, 2010).   
Ghana is not an exception to the pursuance of growth and development through the 
implementation of government programs and projects. Over the years, a significant amount of 
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money has been solicited from many developing partners, IMF, World Bank and Tax Payers 
to embark on programs and projects (Ghana Republic Budget, 2012, 2015; Damoah et al., 
2015; Damoah, 2015; Damoah and Akwei, 2017). Nevertheless, the literature suggests that 
most of these projects have failed (Damoah and Akwei, 2017). We, therefore, propose that 
corruption may influence these programs and project failure.   
 
Corruption in Ghana 
Corruption, particularly in the government sector has become the most discussed topic in 
Ghana in recent years (Bawumia, 2014, 2015 and Addo, 2015). Even though it is difficult to 
find a criminal code that defines corruption (Azeem, 2009), corrupt practices such as bribery 
of local or foreign government officials and private companies, ‘’facilitation of payments’’, 
fraud, embezzlement, theft, collusion, and rent-seeking exist in the country and its pervasive 
(Gyimah-Boadi, 2002).  
Transparency International Report over the years places Ghana among the most corrupt 
countries in the World
1
. Consistent with the definition offered by the World Bank (World 
Bank, 2017), corruption is defined in the study as the abuse of public office for private 
gain.Nevertheless, Tax Justice Network (TJN) (2016) has criticised the definition for leaving 
the impression that it is only people who occupy public office who are capable of abusing 
their office or power TJN suggests the inclusion of practices such as market rigging, insider 
trading, tax dodging, non-disclosure of conflicts of interest, and illicit party funding. Even 
though the TI study’s findings give a picture of the state of corruption in the country, if TJN’s 
criticism and definition are taken into consideration, the state of the phenomenon could even 
be worse in the country. To this end, this study adopts the definition offered by TJN as it’s 
more comprehensive and fits well into this study.  
                                                          
1
 Transparency International (2017).  Corruption Perceptions Index. 
https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview 
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The Ghanaian government has made significant attempts over the years to kerb 
corruption enacting laws, setting up independent bodies and agencies to address the 
phenomenon (Amponsah, 2010). Notable among them are the Ghana Public Procurement 
Act, the Financial Administration Act and its Regulations, the Assets Declaration Act, the 
Whistleblower Act, the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the Public Officers Liability Act, the 
Serious Fraud Office (SFO) and the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative 
Justice (CHRAJ), Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII). Even though these efforts have helped to 
expose corruption (Short, 2010), recent reports suggest that the phenomenon is on the 
increase (Bawumia, 2014, 2015; Addo, 2016; TI, 2017). We argue that these corrupt practices 
in Ghana may affect government project performance. We, therefore, propose that: 
Corruption could influence Ghanaian government projects failure. 
 
Theoretical Antecedents of Factors that may Influence Corruption in Ghana     
The corrupt practices in the country may be influenced by other factors. First, the cultural 
orientation of the country may be translated into the implementation of government projects. 
Hofstede (1983) six cultural dimension may explain why corruption in government projects. 
These dimensions include Power Distance; Individualism; Masculinity; Uncertainty 
Avoidance; Long-Term Orientation and Indulgence.
2
 The Ghanaian society is hierarchical in 
nature, practising a master-servant relationship; where the rich and those in authority are 
revered (The Hofstede Centre, 2016). As a result, government project leaders may have 
significant power to divert projects resources for personal use.  
Second, the political culture may influence corruption that could influence government 
projects failure. Ghana practices multi-party democracy and this has led to partisan politics 
(Bob-Milliar, 2012; Asunka, 2016). Partisan politics may influence corrupt practices, as 
                                                          
2
 For further reading please refer to Hofstede, G., 1983. Cultural dimensions for project management, 
International Journal of Project Management, 1(1), 41-48, for additional understanding of each dimension.  
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empirical studies in politics show that electoral controls of politicians tend to suffer when 
voters are strongly attached to a political party (Hellwig & Samuels, 2008; Kayser & 
Wlezien, 2011). Standardised political agency models also back these findings – there is a 
positive relationship between partisan politics and accountability of political leaders (Besley, 
2007). In agreement with prior studies and political agency models, Asunka, (2016) found 
that Ghanaians fail to hold their political leaders accountable in districts where there is a 
strong attachment to political parties and vice-versa.  
Third, the management and administration practices within the public sector in the 
country may also influence corrupt practices that may influence government projects failure. 
There is a high level of bureaucratic and institutional bottlenecks within the public 
administration system (Amoako & Lyon, 2014) and this may influence corrupt practices in 
the implementation of government projects.  
 
Previous Research on Causes of Projects failure  
Many reasons (factors) have been cited for projects failures. For instance, Frimpong et al. 
(2003) and Long et al. (2004) identified 26 and 64 causes of project failure respectively. In 
spite of the contextualisation of these causes (factors), there are common ones that run 
through the project management literature. A summary of these factors is presented in table 1 
below for emphasis. Surprisingly, attention has not been paid to corruption as a source of 
government projects (especially in developing countries) failure by researchers despite the 
pervasiveness of the phenomenon in these countries. We, therefore, propose that corruption 
would influence the Ghanaian government projects failure. 
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Table 1. General causes of projects failure  
Type of causes  Authors and year of publication 
Communication  Raymond and Bergeron (2008); Weijermars (2009); Wong et al. (2009); Wi 
and Jung (2010); Ochieg and Price (2010) 
Expertise/knowledge Perkins (2006); Sambasian and Soon (2007); Ruuska and Teigland (2009); 
Hwang and Ng (2013) 
Funding/finance  Sambasian and Soon (2007); Sweis et al. (2008); Fabian and Amir (2011) 
Planning  Odeyinka and Yusif (1997); Assaf and AL-Hejji (2006); Pourrastam and 
Ismail (2011); Pinto (2013)  
Resources  Sambasian and Soon (2007); Teigland and Lindqvist (2007); Sweis et al. 
(2008); Ruuska and Teigland (2009); Fabian and Amir (2011); Hwang and 
Ng (2013) 
Scope change  Kaliba et al. (2009); Ahonen and Savolianen (2010); Liu et al. (2011)  
Socio-culture  Blunt (1980); Hofstede (1983); Hogberg and Adamsson (1983); Adler 
(1983); Blunt and Jones (1997); Muriithi and Crawford (2003); Heeks 
(2002, 2006); Saad et al. (2002); Maube et al. (2008); Amid et al. (2012) 
 
 
Previous Research on Corruption 
Extant literature has been devoted to assessing the relationship between corruption and other 
variables. One of the most dominant variables is economic development. For instance, 
Farooq et al. (2013) identified corruption as the factor that impedes economic growth in 
developing countries. A cross-country study of corruption by Saha & Gounder (2013) found 
that countries with low levels of income tend to be more corrupt than their counterparts who 
have high levels of income. Similarly, Treisman (2000) assessed the causes of corruption 
using different countries corruption perception index from Transparency International and 
identified the same trend.  
Saha & Gounder (2013) further found that corruption has a significant social effect. 
Paunov (2016) identified corruption as the factor that impedes innovation. Athanasouli & 
Goujard (2015) also found that corruption impacts firm management quality. In an 
assessment of the relationship between corruption and Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) found a positive relationship. Boycko et al. (1996) found that 
corruption impact on returns on investment. Hessami (2014) found that corruption leads to 
the increment of the government budget. Corruption could also lead to political discontent, 
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instability and violence as evidence in the work of Aisen & Veiga (2013). It also leads to 
rule-violating intentions (Sundstrom, 2016). Jetter et al. (2015) found that there is a 
relationship between corruption and democracy. Corruption also leads to inequality (Dobson 
& Ramlogan-Dobson, 2012).  
In relation to corruption and projects performance, there are few studies that have been 
devoted to the discussion. For instance, Sonuga et al. (2002) identified corruption as one of 
the factors that lead to projects failure in Nigeria. In a comparative analysis of drivers and 
barriers to the adoption of relational contract practices in construction projects using Sydney 
and Beijing, Ling et al. (2014) suggest that such contract type could lead to corruption 
allegations. Similarly, Bowen et al. (2015) identified corruption as the factor that impacts on 
the construction industry in South Africa. Locatelli et al. (2017) discussed types of 
corruptions and the characteristics of projects that are more likely to suffer from it in 
‘’corrupt project context’’ of megaprojects using an Italian high-speed railway as a case 
study. They identified several characteristics that increase the odds of megaprojects to suffer 
corruption. They include project size, uniqueness, heavy involvement of the government and 
technical and organizational complexity. Moreover, they suggest that those projects executed 
in countries where there are high levels of corruption are more likely to suffer from 
corruption than less corrupt country projects-context. They also found that corruption affects 
project management success and projects success.  
The literature suggests that an attempt has been made to cite corruption as a factor for 
projects failure; however, they did not discuss how corruption impacts on government 
projects in developing country context – where the phenomenon is pervasive. By exploring 
how corruption impacts on government project performance, using multiple project 
assessment criteria, we extend the call to discuss the impact of corruption on project 
performance (Locatelli et al., 2017).  
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Theoretical Framework 
In this research, we move away from the common factors of projects failure by exploring the 
relationship between corruption and government projects failure using multiple projects 
success/failure criteria adapted from Atkinson (1999) square route framework as presented in 
Figure 1 below. We propose that: Corruption could influence Ghanaian government projects 
failure in the form of abandonment, requirement deviation, cost overrun, time overrun, 
stakeholder dissatisfaction and retard sector where projects are implemented and national 
development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
METHODOLOGY  
Figure 1 Corruption and government projects failure conceptual framework  
 
Corruption 
Project 
Success/failure 
Criteria 
 Forms of 
corruption in 
Ghana 
 Nepotism  
 Partisanship  
 Cronyism 
 Tendering  
 Bribery  
 Rent-seeking 
 Bottlenecks  
 Personal gains 
 Abuse of position  
 Kick-backs  
 
 
Iron Triangle  
 Time 
Cost 
Requirement  
Sector & national 
development 
Abandonment 
Ghana government 
Programs/projects 
failure 
 
Stakeholder 
satisfaction/benef
its 
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This study adopted the interpretive philosophy and the social construction paradigm. Due to 
the lack of research in this area in developing countries, the interpretive paradigm was 
deemed appropriate since, the practical knowledge sought in this study is embedded in the 
developing country context, the stakeholder interactions and meanings (Crotty, 1998; 
Bryman, 2012). Projects are unique (Soderlund, 2004); and factors affecting failure depends 
on geographical location (Ahsan and Gunawan, 2010), and socio-cultural settings (Maumbe 
et al., 2008), who is assessing the project (Ika, 2009; Carvalho, 2014) and the criteria being 
used for the assessment (Amir & Pinnington, 2014). We, therefore, assumed that corrupt 
practices that may influence failure may be specific to the local context. Thus, the social 
constructionism paradigm assisted the researchers to generate new understandings of the 
influences of corruption on government project failure as the stakeholders constructed 
meanings in their unique ways, which were dependent on the Ghanaian context, experiences 
and frames of reference of the world they tried to interpret (Crotty, 1998; Silverman, 2013).   
We used the purposive sampling technique to select four sets of participants for the 
study: the general public; contractors; government officials leading and/or involved in 
government projects (Clients), and project management practitioners (PMP). The participants 
were selected based on two criteria; knowledge of corruption and government project failure 
in Ghana (Teddlie & Yu, 2007; Saunders et al., 2012), and practitioners who work for active 
and well-known project management companies. We targeted the general public because they 
are the main beneficiaries of government projects (Ahsan & Gunawan, 2010) and even 
though some of them might not possess the technical know-how in the implementation 
process, they follow the implementation and the outcomes of government projects closely; 
hence, their perceptions of the project performance is important. 
Further, we used the qualitative research approach to collect data within the Ghanaian 
environment in which it naturally occurs supported by the social meanings of the four 
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participants. The data were collected using the semi-structured interview which gave 
participants the freedom to provide in-depth knowledge and reliable comparable country-
specific data for the study. We adopted a face-to-face and Skype interview to allow further 
probing questions. The initial idea was to conduct all interviews on face-to-face physical 
presence but, some of them had to be conducted through Skype due to the busy schedules of 
some participants during the daytime.  
A pilot interview involving four (4) participants (one from each category) was 
conducted and analysed to ensure the validity of the research questions (Foddy, 1994). We 
conducted a total of thirty (30) interviews with the participants (See the full profile of 
respondents in table 2 in the appendix) to yield insight from their illuminative and rich 
information sources (Patton, 2002). The interviews were conducted in participants’ homes, 
offices, construction sites and on Skype by pre-booking an appointment. During the 
interviews, the snowball technique was also used to identify further participants (Bryman, 
2012; Saunders et al., 2012). The numbers of participants were not pre-determined at the 
beginning of the interviews but data was collected until we reached a saturation point, where 
the data had been thoroughly optimised such that no new information emerged from 
participants (Morse, 1995, 2000; Hill et al., 2005; Silverman, 2013; Guest et al., 2006).  
The interviews were conducted between June 2014 and February 2015. All the 
interviews were conducted in English (the official language of Ghana). The participants were 
asked about their perceptions of how corruption influences the Ghanaian government 
projects failure in terms of cost, time, requirement, stakeholder benefits, abandonment, and 
contribution to sector and nation development. They were constantly reminded of these 
criteria and each criterion was re-phrased as a separate question to ensure that all the aspects 
of the failure criteria were addressed by participants. Each interview lasted between thirty 
(30) and fifty minutes (50).  
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All the interviews were transcribed after each interview. The transcribed data were 
uploaded into the NVivo10 software and reduced by selecting, focusing and condensing the 
information. The data were analysed using the thematic analysis through a line by line 
approach to identify themes based on the framework developed in figure 1. After the line by 
line coding, content and cross-case analysis were conducted to code sentences that explain 
the themes. Axial coding was also conducted to identify and explain the relationship between 
corruption and Ghanaian government projects failure. The themes developed from the open 
coding were grouped together, based on their relationship with each other. We first mapped 
the themes with the initial framework in Figure 1, and then expanded these into overarching 
and sub-themes to explain the relationship between them (Braun and Clarke, 2006) (See 
Figure 2 and Table 2). Most of the overarching themes of corruption were developed from in 
vivo codes whilst the sub-themes were developed from the initial conceptual framework. We 
then reviewed the themes to ensure that they work in relation to the data set through visiting 
and comparing the data many times to verify and confirm the themes identified (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994).  
The themes were then refined, defined and organised into a coherent framework that 
explains corruption and government project failure (see Figure 2) (Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
Thus, the themes from the initial framework (Figure 1) became prominent, the relationship 
between the various parts changed and specific aspects were clarified which led to 
modifications in the conceptual framework developed from the literature review to the 
current theoretical framework in figure 2. Based on the analysis, the multiple realities 
constructed by the four sets of participants were used to develop both a diagrammatic model 
and a narrative of the influence of corruption on Ghanaian government projects failure 
(Remenyi, et al., 1998).  
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ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS  
Research Question 1: Corruption and Project abandonment  
The respondents revealed that in some cases, corrupt practices may result in total 
abandonment of government projects and suggested that this could be traced to politics. The 
contractors and project management practitioners perceived that in some cases, project 
abandonment occurs due to government appointee’s project leaders’ demand for bribes from 
contractors, and if they refuse, they would do anything possible for the projects to fail. They 
would therefore not approve documentations from such contractors; hence, the contractors 
have no option than to abandon such projects. For instance, one project management 
practitioner said that: 
 
I have a personal experience, the official wanted me to pay for his fuel –you know 
what I mean, and I refused, because of that he didn’t want to sign my documents 
for me, I had to spend so much time moving up and down. So I also got angry and 
left the project. As I speak, the project is still lying down (P7). 
 
The respondents also said that this often happens because government project contracts are 
mainly awarded on ‘whom you know’ and on party lines rather than on merit. The perception 
is that if contracts are awarded on these lines, these monies could be ‘’kick back’’ to help run 
their respective political parties. For example, according to P6, it is rare to get contracts 
without knowing anybody, more especially local contracts. And once you know the person, 
these malpractices would ‘definitely happen even if you don’t want to... If you ask the 
government officials, they would deny it because of their position and for fear of the media’. 
Some of the government officials interviewed, admitted, though, that they have heard people 
talk about these corrupt practices being the reasons for some projects abandonment but, they 
have not witnessed it themselves. P21, for instance, admitted that corruption could lead to 
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project abandonment, but he does not think corruption alone should be a reason to abandon a 
project,   
 
Why should you abandon the project because you have realised corruption is 
taking place? Maybe, that might be the underlying factor, but other factors such as 
delays in payment or change of government.   
 
The general public, in particular, were of the view that corruption is the main reason why 
government projects are abandoned and attributed it to change of government. They stated 
that the government who takes over from the previous government would not want to 
continue their projects simply because they cannot get any ‘kickbacks’. 
 
Why would they be keen to continue the previous government projects when they 
know the contract has already been awarded and they have no chance of getting 
any kicks backs for themselves and their party; my brother, this is common 
knowledge and open secret in this country (P9). 
 
This is in agreement with earlier studies that found that party members collude with 
government officials and contractors to syphon government funds through construction 
contracts and then, they pay back in the form of kickbacks (Luna, 2015). Further, this could 
be traced to the national culture of Ghanaians as there is a very strong family bond, which 
serves as the primary source of identity, loyalty and responsibility (The Hofstede Centre, 
2016). Political parties are regarded as a family where members join and participate in 
political activities with the aim of obtaining benefits (Bob-Milliar, 2012).   
 
Research Question 2: Corruption and Projects Cost Overrun   
All the participants agreed that corruption leads to cost deviation which results in cost 
escalation. The majority of the participants (25) identified cost escalation as number one 
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among all the failure criteria used for the assessment. For instance, P17 stated that ‘cost 
escalation is the main and probably the number one area in which corruption impact on 
Ghana government projects failure’. They argue that cost escalation comes in many forms, 
such as government officials and contractors inflating project prices,  
 
 ‘look, the government officials would connive with the contractor involved in 
the projects or programs to increase the prices, so that at the end of it all, they 
would share the extra money’ (P1). 
 
The project management practitioners said that in most cases, the contractors would wish to 
avoid such corrupt practice, but ‘their hands are tied’ (P4, P6, P8, P10), because if they do not 
do so, they would not get the contract; and their competitors would pay as stated by P14, 
 
this is an open secret, nobody would accept that they pay to get a contract and that 
they also have to add it to the total contract sum, but this is real. You can ask 
everybody in this country and they would tell you the same thing or even worse 
things than what I am telling you. Ask even a small boy or girl, and they would 
confirm this.   
 
Further, the analysis revealed that sometimes suppliers who provide contractors with products 
on credits are the same as the government officials and therefore, connive to inflate quotation 
prices of the products so that they can share. The analysis revealed that in Ghana, it has 
become a norm to pay ten percent or more of the contract sum to government officials 
involved in the project implementation, which is then added onto the overall contract  sum 
awarded as stated by P16, ‘you know what, payment of ten percent of contract money by 
contractors to government officials involved in government projects in Ghana has become normal, if 
you do not pay, forget about the contract’. In all, twenty-two respondents mentioned the ten 
percent bribe as the reason for cost escalation and project abandonment with the exception of 
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eight respondents, seven government officials, and onecontractor who identified the ten 
percent bribe but, did not attribute cost escalation solely to the ten percent bribe.  
 
In most cases, when there is escalation of government projects cost, they 
(citizens) think that we the government officials have collected money from 
contractors, this perception is not always true, most of these cost escalation is due 
to other factors which are mainly on the part of the civil servants and not 
politicians (P23).  
 
Similarly, the participants perceived that in most cases, there are ‘unauthorised middlemen’ 
who serve as the ‘link’ between the contractor and the public servant. The analysis revealed 
that, in most government projects, especially at the local level you can only win a contract if 
you have a middleman, as P28  puts it ‘rarely would you be able to win a contract if you do 
not have such middlemen who can connect you’. These middlemen have grown very strong 
in the country because the government officials use them as fronts to avoid being recognised. 
In view of this, these middlemen charge both the contractor and the government officials for 
their services and these monies are added onto the contract sum. This excerpt from the 
interview explains this,’ the government officials do not want to ‘go with their ‘’face’’ for 
fear of being caught by the media and the subsequent disgrace that would follow’ (P26). 
These corrupt practices which may influence cost escalation could be traced to the 
cultural-orientation inherited from colonial rule. This finding is not surprising as previous 
research have linked poor projects performance in the public sector to cultural orientation in 
the country (Amponsah, 2010; Damoah & Akwei, 2017). In the colonial era, the public sector 
work was perceived to belong to the White colonial masters and as such could be handled 
haphazardly (Amponsah, 2010; Damoah, 2015; Damoah et al., 2015; Damoah & Akwei, 
2017). Further, the sector is regarded as a ‘’national cake’’ where everybody should try and 
cut as much as possible for their personal gains (share) (Damoah et al., 2015; Damoah & 
18 
 
Akwei, 2017). This encourages people within the country who have access to public money 
to try as much as possible to embezzle government funds through projects implementation. 
The implication is that the government ends up spending excessively on projects and 
programs implementation and extra resources to curb and/or control these corrupt practices.  
This finding confirms prior studies conducted in the construction industry and in 
developing countries. Cheng (2014) found cost overrun as a common problem in the 
construction industry and Kaliba et al. (2009), Ahsan & Gunawan (2010), and Aziz (2013) all 
found cost deviation in project implementation in developing countries. Cost deviation in 
project management has become a norm in organisations (Pinto, 2014). Although our 
findings confirm earlier studies, it extends the literature through identifying corruption as a 
further source of cost escalation as the previous studies did not look at corruption as a source 
of cost of escalation in project management. The implication of this finding to policymakers 
and practitioners is that, though there are many factors for cost deviation in projects 
management (Frimpong et al., 2003; Sambasian & Soon, 2007; Kaliba et al., 2009; Ahsan & 
Gunawan, 2010 and Aziz, 2013), they should not focus only on the common factors such as 
inflation, delays in payment, scope change but, in addition, focus on context-specific issues 
such as corrupt practices which are pervasive in developing countries.      
 
Research Question 3: Corruption and Time Overrun   
The study revealed that corruption could influence Ghanaian government projects and 
programs failure in the form of time deviation. Participants argue that corrupt practices have 
direct and indirect effects on the duration of Ghanaian government projects. Directly, they 
perceive that in most cases, contractors and politicians deliberately delay projects through 
connivance. The argument is that once, there is a delay, the cost would be escalated and they 
could use that as a means to embezzle funds for their personal gains. Twenty (20) of the 
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respondents said that government officials; public servants and civil servants who serve as 
consultants (experts) demand money and other resources such as fuel from contractors before 
they certify the progress projects. This may influence delays if contractors are not willing to 
comply. The implication is that the cost of the project would escalate once there is a delay in 
certification, 
sometimes, the contractors must buy fuel for the consultants to travel to the project's 
site; though they have already received their monthly pay... if you fail to buy the 
fuel, forget it, they would never go and inspect the project for you to move on with 
the project (P7). 
 
 ‘they would ask for fuel but in reality, they are talking about money’ (P8). 
 
The participants attributed these corrupt practices to politics.  They believe that the culture of 
corruption has come about due to the political nature of the appointment of these consultants. 
Hence, they can engage in these practices with impunity, knowing that if they are caught, 
they cannot be sacked. The issue of political appointment of consultants is due to the 
Ghanaian constitution that entrusts a lot of powers to the executives (particularly the 
president) in the appointment of public servants.   
Time deviation (escalation) has been identified as a cause of projects failure in 
developing countries in relation to performing organisations and clients related issues such as 
scope change, poor planning, communication and delays in payment (see Frimpong et al., 
2003; Sambasivan & Soon, 2007; Sweis et al., 2008; Kaliba et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2011); 
however, it has not been discussed in relation to corruption for such delays, this study bridges 
this gap in the literature in developing countries.  
 
Research Question 4: Corruption and Projects Requirement Deviation  
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The analysis of data revealed that some Ghanaian government projects deliverables often do 
not meet requirements due to corruption. Shoddy work is produced in some circumstances, 
especially in projects that are directly awarded by Ghanaian government officials. Thus, the 
quantity and quality of the deliverables are sometimes compromised due to corruption. This 
was attributed  to the lack of supervision by government consultants and regulatory bodies 
such as quality control officers; hence, contractors end up using the wrong products when 
carrying out projects. They opined that in most cases, the consultants (inspectors) who are 
supposed to inspect projects at various stages of the projects life cycle often collude and 
connive with the contractors to use sub-standard materials which are obviously cheaper than 
the quality ones in a bid to save the money for themselves, ‘sometimes instead of say five 
types of cement, they would agree to use two or three.’(P24), and the consultants are unable 
to supervise and monitor project standardisation. However, they perceive that the consultants 
cannot be sacked because they are political appointees or the government has influence in 
their appointment. 
 
You dare not try to sack such consultants, they have strong political backing. Some are hundred 
percent political party appointments, and you know how politicians are very powerful in this 
country. So, if you are a contractor, you just have to compromise or forget about getting 
another job.  … Corruption goes with politics in Ghana in all parts of life here and not only in 
projects management (P30). 
 
This practice is very common in government projects. Participants P5, P2, P3 and P18 
compared this practice between the public and private sector and concluded that although 
some contractors work for both government and the private sector, they collect bribes in the 
public sector but, cannot do so in the private sector. In words of P18, 
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 It’s funny to know that it the same contractors who work for both the private man 
and the government but they know that they can engage in these corrupt practices in 
the public sector but they are afraid to do so in the private sector. So the problem has 
to do with the government officials and the mentality they have for government 
work’. People think that it is the only way that they can have a fair share of the 
national cake – the ordinary Ghanaian thinks that government officials or politicians 
are ‘’chopping’’ the taxpayers money anyhow, so they must also ‘’chop’’ as much as 
possible if they get the opportunity.    
 
Similarly, eleven of the respondents said: because  government officials and contractors do 
not want to be exposed, they would agree in secret for the contractors to pay them ‘’in kind’. 
They said the industry where this occurs most is in the construction sector where the officials 
would ask the contractor to build a house for them during the construction of the main 
projects. 
 
 So before the project is completed, they would also have at least one house – 
depending on the nature of the project and the duration, sometimes, they can get like 
two or three houses before a major construction project is completed. That is why 
you can see when roads are constructed, you would see potholes in less than a year 
after completion, sometimes even before the whole stretch of the road is completed, 
and those that were constructed earlier on would have potholes. My friend, you can’t 
blame the contractor, he also needs to make a profit (P1).   
 
The implication is that once they have used part of the contract money to build a house for 
the government officials, they also need to reduce the quality so that they can make a profit.  
 
Research Question 5: Corruption and Stakeholder Dissatisfaction  
One area that participants perceive that corruption would influence project failure is in the 
area of stakeholders benefits or satisfaction. Apart from P19 and P30; all of the participants 
mentioned that when there is corruption, citizens do not receive all the benefits that they are 
supposed to receive from such public projects. They perceive that once corruption affects the 
22 
 
management phase of the project, it will have ripple effects on the benefits that the key 
stakeholders are supposed to receive and often referred to the key stakeholders as the general 
public/citizens. This is due to the fact that government projects in developing countries are 
mainly implemented purposely for the ‘’ordinary citizens’’  (Ahsan & Gunawan, 2010). P13, 
for instance, stated that: 
 
When there are corrupt practices during government projects implementation, the citizens do 
not enjoy all the benefits. Assuming, because of corruption, wrong quality of the road is 
constructed, few years, sometimes months and the road has ‘’potholes’’, who suffers; it is you 
and I, the ordinary Ghanaian.  So, my brother, stakeholders such as the ordinary citizens 
would not be satisfied because they are not benefiting as expected. 
 
P1, P12, P13, P23, P26  argue that when there is corruption, what is supposed to go to the 
citizens go into individual ‘pockets’ and as such are unable to realise the full benefits. For 
example, P23 stated that,  
assuming the actual cost of the project that the central government has approved 
is $20m, and before the project begins, $5m is lost through corruption, I am 
quoting it in dollars because most of these projects are quoted in dollars and not 
cedis. Now, do you think the contractor is going to use $15m or $20 to execute 
the project? So, obviously, if he uses $15m, the people will not get all the 
benefits that they are supposed to get, hence, they won’t be happy. They won’t 
be happy because they are aware of these practices; this is an open secret.  
 
Research Question 6: Corruption and Underdevelopment of Sectors where Projects are 
Implemented and National development  
The study revealed that corrupt practices in the management of Ghanaian government 
projects affect the development of the sector in which such projects are implemented. 
Ultimately, this has a significant impact on the overall national development as government 
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projects are perceived to be an engine for national development (Alzahrani & Emsley, 2013; 
Amoatey et al., 2015).   
The findings show that under-development of sectors and national development comes 
in both direct and indirect. Directly, when there is corruption in the implementation of the 
Ghanaian government projects, the sectors are unable to develop as expected because funds 
are sometimes redirected for personal use by officials and projects are delayed or abandoned 
altogether, ‘so obviously it affects the sector where the projects are implemented and 
ultimately retard national development’ (P3). Indirectly, corruption leads to economic and 
social hardships which impacts on the sector and national development; thus, if there are 
socio-economic hardships, it is the citizens who suffer. They perceive that if projects are not 
able to achieve their projected objectives such as time, requirement and cost, citizens are 
unable to benefit fully from such projects, hence, affecting national development as a whole. 
This assertion was unanimous among all participants. In the words of one of the participant, 
 
Corruption undermines national development; it is not only in the implementation of 
government projects or programs but all other parts of governance of our country. 
You know what, all the problems we have in Ghana in terms of development is 
corruption – people always talk about corruption in projects because those ones are 
obvious and visible but trust me, everywhere there is corruption and they are 
affecting the country (P8).  
 
 
The figure 2 below illustrates the findings.  
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The figure 2 above shows that corruption in Ghana comes in many forms and types. This 
happens at the individual, institutional and relationships levels. This may then influence 
Ghanaian government projects failure in the form of abandonment, negative requirement 
deviation, cost overrun, time overrun, stakeholder dissatisfaction, and sector and national 
under-development.  
 
CONCLUSIONS  
This study explored how corruption leads to government projects failure, using multiple 
failure criteria within the Ghanaian context.  Six questions were addressed and are:   
RQ1: How does corruption influence abandonment of Ghanaian government projects? 
The study found that in some cases, corrupt practices result in total abandonment of 
Figure 2. A model summarising the findings on Corruption and government projects failure  
 
Corruption 
Projects 
failure 
Criteria 
 
Institutional 
 Tendering 
(sole-
sourcing)  
 Bribery  
 Rent-
seeking  
 Bottlenecks  
Individual 
 Personal gains 
 Abuse of position  
 Kick-backs  
 
Relationships 
 Nepotism  
 Partisanship  
 Cronyism  
 
Cost overrun  
Requirement 
deviation (negative) 
Time overrun  
Sector & national 
under-
development 
Abandonment 
Ghana government 
Programmes/projects 
failure 
Stakeholder 
dissatisfaction (not 
benefits) 
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government projects. This was traced mainly to partisanship politics. It was revealed that in 
some projects abandonment cases, the government appointees who lead projects demand 
bribes from contractors and if they refuse, they would want to halt the project. They would 
therefore not approve documentations from such contractors; hence, the contractors would 
have no option than to abandon such projects. Moreover, they would stifle the progress of 
projects that were commenced by the previous government – in order to gain political capital 
out of it.   
RQ2: How does corruption influence cost overrun of Ghanaian government projects? 
The study found that government officials go into the management of projects with the 
intentions of making money for personal gains and also to use the money to support their 
party. They, therefore, inflate contracts sums through connivance with contractors. Further, 
the processes of awarding of government projects contract breed corrupt practices. Contracts 
awards take long processes and as such contractors and government officials engage the 
services of unofficial middlemen who take at least ten percent of the contract sums. 
Consequently, the contractors pass this on to the projects sum.  
RQ3: How does corruption influence time overrun of Ghanaian government projects? 
Civil and public servants are mainly appointed by the government in the form of consultants 
often indulge in corrupt practices during projects management implementation that may lead 
to government projects failure. They request for ‘’fuel money’’ before they certify projects 
for further works to continue or the completion of projects. Failure by contractors to comply 
with their request means that the project(s) has to come to a standstill.  
RQ4: How does corruption influence negative requirement deviation of Ghanaian 
government projects? 
The processes of awarding of government projects contract breed corrupt practices. Contracts 
awards take long processes and as such contractors and government officials engage the 
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services of unofficial middlemen who take at least ten percent of the contract sums. Some 
officials also take the same percent of contract sums either in cash or in kind for their 
personal gains. Consequently, the contractors reduce the quality and quantity of the project 
deliverables.   
RQ5: How does corruption influence stakeholder dissatisfaction of Ghanaian 
government projects? 
It was found that once corruption affects the management phase of the projects, it will have 
ripple effects on the benefits that the key stakeholders are supposed to gain. Even though 
different stakeholders are affected, the key stakeholder(s) mostly affected are the general 
public. 
RQ6: How does corruption influence Ghanaian government projects that may lead to 
the retarding of the sector where projects are implemented and national development? 
Like the stakeholder dissatisfaction, this is an indirect impact. The finding is that once 
corruption has affected government projects at the management level and the project has 
failed at the management level, it would have indirect effects, hence, failure  of the public 
sector in which the projects are implemented. The ultimate effect would be in the national 
development.  
Overall, the findings indicate that corruption influence government projects failure on 
all the failure criteria used as the evaluating tool. However, corruption influences failure at 
two different levels – project management and product phase level. At the management level, 
corruption has direct influence whilst at the product level, the influence is indirect. Moreover, 
the corrupt practices happen at three different levels: individual, institutional and 
relationships; and at any level, they can influence the projects to fail. The implication is that 
policymakers and practitioners should make conscious efforts to reduce and/or avoid corrupt 
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practices at the management level in order to avoid the subsequent effects on the product 
phase level.    
 
Practical Implication  
This study extends the causes of projects failure literature by discussing how corruption 
influence projects failure in government projects failure in a developing country context. The 
findings of the research will be value-bound and significant to the four key stakeholders in 
government project within the Ghanaian environment due to the socially constructed process 
of interaction, co-generation, and interpretation of corruption as a source of government 
project failure in Ghana. Therefore, policymakers and project management practitioners 
would be able to use findings as a guide during government programs or projects 
implementation to avoid corrupt practices that may eventually influence failure. Specifically, 
the use of hard copies of projects documents should be replaced with electronic ones; this 
will help reduce corruption and delays in accessing projects documents, which compels 
practitioners to indulge in corrupt practices. This can also help easy access of projects 
documents by the media and the general public – this will help monitoring and transparency.  
Secondly, Ghanaian government should make the monitoring of its projects a priority 
with minimal political interference. Thus, projects should be left with technocrats to manage 
public projects rather than political patronage. There should be independent body devoid of 
party politics.  
Thirdly, to reduce shoddy works (projects deliverables); independent laboratories 
should be allowed to test projects materials rather than the assemblies; which are part of the 
government. Consultants who monitor and certify completion of Ghanaian the government 
projects should be independent. The part which has to be certified by government should 
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constitute incumbent party and the opposition members of parliaments (MPs). This will help 
reduce partisanship that leads to corrupt practices.  
Moreover, it is important for the leadership of Ghanaian government projects to 
institute projects offices separate from government agencies. This will help reduce political 
interference and political patronage that influence corruption.  
In addition, stricter laws need to be enacted by parliament to ensure that projects cannot 
be halted when there is a change of government. Also, the role of national development 
planning commission to set out programmes and plan for development devoid of politics 
should be strengthened in order to reduce projects being halted with changes in government.   
 
Academic Implications  
Despite the contextualization of projects and programmes and their associated factors 
(causes) that lead to failure, there are commons ones that run through projects management 
literature as presented in Table 1. This current research extends the causes of project failure 
to include corruption as a major factor that influences project failure in a developing country. 
By focusing on corruption, this study sheds light on the phenomenon as a major contributing 
factor in developing countries; where corrupt practices in the public sector are pervasive. In 
spite of the pervasiveness of the practice in developing countries and their potential to affect 
project implementation within the public sector, researchers have not paid much attention to 
it. Therefore, this research would serve as a springboard to academics, researchers and project 
management practitioner for further research into the relationship between corruption and 
projects failure, particularly through quantitative study.  
Further, by assessing how corruption may influence government projects failure using 
multiple projects failure criteria, it provides a deeper understanding of how corruption affects 
government projects performance. Previous studies, though have mentioned that corruption 
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can lead to projects failure, but, did not discuss how this actually happens (Heeks, 1999; 
Corojan & Criado, 2012; Kim, 2014). This study, therefore, extends the projects management 
literature by exploring how this happens.     
The work of Aladwani (2016) provides a theoretical exposition to corruption and e-
government projects failure, the current research extends the literature by conducting an 
empirical study. Further, Aladwani (2016) did not use multiple failure criteria or any 
individual criterion that is used in the evaluation of projects performance. By using multiple 
criteria in the assessment, further research could be conducted to compare the extent to which 
corruption could impact on projects failure on the various criterions.  
Finally, this study provides a theoretical framework for the assessment of the 
relationships that exist between corruption and government projects failure with multiple 
failure criteria.  
 
Limitations and Further Research  
Due to the sampling technique used, the finding cannot be generalised; however, this serves 
as an exploratory study that provides platforms for further research. Further research would 
be needed as a confirmatory study that would involve quantitative data and large sample to 
assess the extent to which corruption could influence government projects failure, using the 
multiple failure criteria identified in the framework. A representative sample technique would 
assist to uncover the entire industry players in order to generalise findings.  
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APPENDIX  
Respondents’ Profile   
         Table 2. In-depth Semi-structured Interview Profile      
Respondents Age Education Years of 
Experience 
in Current 
position 
Work 
Experience 
In Project 
Manageme
nt/Impleme
ntation  
Overall 
Work 
Experience 
Industry  Sector  
 
PROJECT MANAGEMENT PRACTITIONERS 
P1(Project 
Manager) 
61 Masters 7 15 37 ICT Private & 
Public 
P2 (Project and 
Programs 
Consultant) 
57 PhD/ 
Professional 
12 15 32 ICT Public & 
Private  
P3 (Architect) 37 BA/ 
Professional 
4 10 10 General Public  
P4 (Structural 
Engineer) 
40 BA/ 
Professional 
4 14 14 General Public  
P5 (Project 
manager) 
47 BA/Professio
nal  
3 15 18 ICT Public & 
private  
P6 (Civil 
engineer) 
41 Masters/Prof
essional  
5 10 13 Construction  Public & 
private  
P7 (Project Co-
ordinator ) 
55 Masters 10 15 26 General  Public & 
private  
P8 (Consultant) 60 PhD/Professi
onal  
15 25 30 General  Public & 
private  
P9 (Architect) 39 Masters 4 5 11 General  Public & 
private  
P10 (Consultant & 
Lecturer) 
46 PhD/ 
Professional 
15 15 21 General Public & 
Private  
P11 (Architect) 37 BA/PgD/ 
Professional 
4 10 10 General Public  
P12 (Structural 
Engineer) 
40 BA/ 
Professional 
4 14 14 General Public  
P13 (Quantity 
Surveyor) 
39 BA/ 
Professional 
15 15 15 General Public  
P14 (Physical & 
Works Director) 
55 Masters/ 
Professional 
1 32 32 Education Public  
 
CONTRACTORS 
P15 (Director) 39 Professional 15 15 15 General Private & 
Public 
P16 (CEO & 
Administrator) 
55 Masters/ 
Professional 
1 32 32 General  Private & 
Public 
P17(Administrativ
e Director) 
45 BA 7 15 19 Construction Private & 
Public 
P18 (Real Estate 
Developer) 
62 A-Level  35 35 40 Construction  Private & 
Public  
P19 (Finance & 
Administrative 
Director) 
27 Masters 4 15 15 Construction Public  
P20 (Director) 45 A-Level 7 7 25 Construction Public & 
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private 
 
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS (CLIENTS) 
P21 (Project 
Coordinator) 
50 BA 2 2 27 General  Public  
P22 (Consultant) 45 BA/PgD/Prof
essional  
10 17 20 General  Public  
P23 (Consultant) 60 BA/Professio
nal  
5 15 40 General  Public  
P24 (Administrator) 55 Masters 5 8 30 Healthcare Public  
P25 (Deputy 
Administrator) 
40 BA/Professio
nal  
3 7 17 General   Public  
 
GENERAL PUBLIC 
P26 (Media 
Practitioner) 
45 Diploma  7 - 25 Construction Public & 
private 
P27 (Teacher) 42 Diploma 19 - 19 Education & 
Retail 
Public & 
Private  
P28 (Medical 
Practitioners) 
45 BSc 15 2 15 Healthcare  Public & 
Private  
P29 (Teacher & 
Business Woman) 
38 Diploma 10 - 10 Education & 
Retail 
Public & 
Private  
P30 (Banker) 31 BA 5 1 7 Banking Public  
 
